Germany has again vetoed any Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jet export to Turkey. If Berlin persists in denying Turkey the Typhoon, Ankara’s efforts to at least partially diversify its air force, especially its fighter jet fleet, will hit a major stumbling block.
The outgoing German coalition government led by caretaker Chancellor Olaf Scholz has reportedly blocked the sale in response to the Turkish government’s arrest of Istanbul mayor Ekrem Imamoglu in March, the German Handelsblattbusiness newspaper reported Thursday.
Turkey has been in talks with the United Kingdom and Spain over a Eurofighter acquisition since at least 2023. The UK has pushed for a sale to Ankara since at least 2022. Germany, which has blocked arms sales to Turkey in the past over Ankara’s cross-border operations in Syria, was reluctant to approve any deal from the start.
There were signs in recent months that Berlin would cease blocking Britain and the other consortium members, Italy and Spain, from selling Ankara the European fighter. Middle East Eye reported in September 2024 that the German Federal Security Council decided in a secret meeting to authorize the consortium “to share specifications of the fighter jet with Turkey and begin technical consultations.”
The following month, Scholz visited Istanbul and met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. While they strongly disagreed over the war in Gaza, they both had positive things to say about the prospect of a Eurofighter deal. In December, two Royal Air Force Eurofighters landed in an airbase outside Turkey’s capital on their way home from a drill in Qatar for inspection by Turkish officials.
Germany “mandated its sales authority” to work on a potential sale in November. Reuters reported in January that Turkey submitted a list of its technical requirements to the British defense ministry and was awaiting a price proposal.
Then came Imamoglu’s arrest, which Scholz’s government strongly condemned. Of course, things could change under Germany’s next government, and Scholz’s decision may ultimately prove short-lived. However, if it isn’t and Germany stops any deal indefinitely, that could adversely impact Ankara’s efforts to diversify its air force, which overwhelmingly consists of American-made aircraft.
In recent years, Turkish officials have questioned the wisdom of relying so heavily on the United States for fighter jets. The backbone of the Turkish Air Force has long consisted of the third largest fleet of F-16s worldwide, supplemented by a small number of aged F-4 Phantoms.
Turkey is presently negotiating a deal for 40 new Block 70 F-16s but is also looking to see if the Trump administration will allow it to buy 40 fifth-generation F-35 Lightning II stealth jets. Washington banned Ankara from purchasing any of the latter in 2019 following its acquisition of advanced Russian S-400 Triumf air defense missile systems.
With some exceptions, several countries across the Middle East have bought different fighters from more than one country. In recent years, Qatar has bought three 4.5-generation fighter types—the Eurofighter, Rafale, and the advanced F-15QA variant—from three different countries. Saudi Arabia operates F-15s and Eurofighters, and the United Arab Emirates operates F-16s and Mirage 2000s. Abu Dhabi will soon replace the latter aircraft with 80 Rafales F4s ordered in 2021.
Outside the Middle East, Greece has long operated French Mirage 2000s alongside its F-16s. It’s presently in the midst of upgrading most of its F-16s to the latest Block 72 configuration and is replacing its Mirage 2000s with Rafales.
Turkey wants 40 Eurofighters: 20 secondhand, possibly even early model Tranche 1s, and 20 of the latest advanced factory-fresh Tranche 4 models. Ankara opting for less advanced and used fighters is ironic, considering it mocked Greece for acquiring ex-French Air Force Dassault Rafale F3Rs in recent years.
Along with the Eurofighter, Ankara wants the Meteor beyond visual range air-to-air missile, which can hit targets over 100 miles away. Turkey undoubtedly sees the Eurofighter acquisition as necessary to match Greece’s recent acquisition of Rafales. Unsurprisingly, Greece is alarmed by the prospect of Turkey acquiring this air-to-air missile since it hoped its recent acquisitions would give the Hellenic Air Force a technological edge over its numerically superior Turkish rival.
Aside from matching Greece’s Rafale acquisition, Turkey undoubtedly saw the Eurofighter acquisition as a way of signaling to the United States that it had other sources for acquiring advanced fighter aircraft. Acquiring Eurofighters would also come with less political headaches than turning to Russia for fighters, which Erdogan briefly flirted with doing in 2019, or China. Similarly, Turkey might find it more politically tenable to buy British-built Eurofighters rather than French Rafales or even Swedish Gripens.
Consequently, if Scholz’s ban outlasts his government and disrupts Turkey’s goal of flying Typhoons by 2030, that would mark a significant blow to Ankara’s nascent efforts to diversify its air force and lessen its dependence on the United States.
Turkey is also developing indigenous fighters. It’s building a supersonic jet trainer and light combat aircraft called the Hurjet and a fifth-generation fighter, the TF Kaan. However, even here, the dependency on the U.S. is immediately evident.
For example, initial batches of the TF Kaan will use the General Electric F-110-GE-129 turbofan engines, the same engine used by the fourth-generation F-16, until Turkey can develop the TEI-TF10000 turbofan engine. Furthermore, the much less advanced Hurjet will have a locally license-built American GE Aerospace F404 turbofan engine.
While Turkey may eventually succeed in building wholly indigenous engines for these aircraft in the long term, it remains heavily dependent on the U.S. until it can do so. So long as the engines are American-made, Washington will have the ultimate say over which countries Turkey can export these aircraft, even if the rest of the components in these respective aircraft are entirely Turkish-made.
The U.S. has exercised this veto power over Turkish arms exports before. For example, Washington objected to a landmark $1.5 billion export deal Turkey signed with Pakistan in 2018 for 30 of its locally-built T-129 ATAK attack helicopters. Since U.S.-made LHTEC T800-4A turboshaft engines powered the helicopters, the deal could not proceed, and Islamabad ultimately canceled it in 2022. Notably, the U.S. did not oppose another sale of six T129s to the Philippines, which went ahead.
Germany’s latest blocking of a Eurofighter deal is another striking reminder of how dependent Turkey remains on the U.S. for its air force despite the significant strides Ankara has made in building a formidable domestic arms industry.
