Most experts would agree that the energy sector is currently weathering a storm of aggressively competing claims. Indeed, this can sound like a diplomatic understatement. A key reason is that energy-related factors are embedded in the transformative shift we are witnessing away from the post-WWII international order toward an era of rivalry among major centers of political, economic, and military power.
For help in comprehending the new energy order, we could do much worse than attend to the words of Fatih Birol, a Turkish economist who has served as the Executive Director of the International Energy Agency since 2015. Birol is a recognized global voice on energy matters. He has steered the IEA from its original focus on oil security—set down at its creation right after the 1973 oil crisis—to broader coverage of both carbon and non-carbon sources. In so doing, he has done yeoman’s work updating the relevance of the IEA.
Birol’s position is inescapably a political one. Both he and the IEA have served as routine targets of criticism, whether for favoring the role of fossil fuels or renewables. Rather than respond directly, Birol prefers to return to the facts of the current landscape. These argue that the somewhat orderly markets of the late 20th century are fast fraying today. The World Uncertainty Index, he points out, devised by economists from the IMF and Stanford University to track democratic and economic unpredictability, has hit levels not seen in generations.
In the face of such volatility, Birol has used his position to offer seven pillars he perceives as “certainties.” His brief summaries seek to highlight “important trends that we can identify with some confidence [and] that can help us keep our bearings.
Given his experience and his unparalleled access to energy-related data, there is reason for listening to what he has to say. Overall, his points are well chosen. Most experts would agree that they are necessary. In what follows, I summarize and provide what I hope to be some clarifying commentary on them.
1. The World Has Entered the Age of Electricity
Birol begins with the certainty that we now inhabit the “Age of Electricity.” For well over a century, the history of energy was synonymous with the history of combustion: the burning of coal, oil, and gas. Today, however, while these remain deeply embedded in the global economy, non-carbon sources are growing at twice the rate of overall energy demand.
This is not merely a shift in fuel sources but a structural transformation. Since 2000, electricity has become even more central to daily life in most of the world, while its foundational importance to the most dynamic sectors in global markets can hardly be doubted. The explosive growth of AI, the proliferation of digital communication, the expansion of high-tech manufacturing, are all electric endeavors. In 2025 alone, global investment in data centers is projected to reach $580 billion, exceeding the $540 billion spent on global oil supply.
Globally, however, demand for power is rising due to other factors. Nearly 85% of demand growth is happening in China, India, and Southeast Asia, where industry and the spread of air conditioning in homes, businesses, commercial buildings, schools, and elsewhere are involved. This information comes from the IEA, which also emphasizes that the share of electricity in final energy use is approaching 30% in China, which is much higher than in the U.S. (22%) and EU (21%). While it may be an exaggeration to say the Middle Kingdom qualifies as the world’s first “electro-state,” the Chinese have outdone the West in building and installing non-carbon generation.
Worldwide, as Birol suggests, electricity is colonizing sectors earlier dominated by combustion. This means an ever-growing portion of transport; heating and cooling; portions of industry and manufacturing; agriculture and water treatment; even the military. Electrification is also rewriting the rules of energy security. In the 20th century, security meant protecting oil tankers in marine choke points like the Strait of Hormuz. In the Age of Electricity, it means building grid stability, upgrading cyber-defenses, and securing the supply of metals like copper. A world that runs on electric power is one that cannot function without always on, always reliable supply; as much as this can be a strength, it is also a vulnerability.
2. Renewables Are Resilient And Will Keep Growing
Despite political headwinds, supply chain bottlenecks, and high interest rates, the ascent of renewable energy is an arithmetic inevitability. Across the geopolitical spectrum, hydro, solar, wind, and geothermal power are meeting a majority of new electricity demand. Birol gives special emphasis to solar, which, he rightly says, has achieved a scale of deployment that defies earlier models.
Yet, like other sources, solar has its limits and trade-offs. Birol’s claim that it is “cold, hard, economic logic” driving growth is countered, for example, by the fact that their intermittency creates unreliability that must be compensated, whether by back-up generation, energy storage technologies, or electricity imports. These and other realities add significantly to costs and can’t eliminate the short lifespan of current solar technology (25-30 years) compared, say, to hydropower or nuclear (50-80 years). On the other hand, another important rationale for renewables beyond economics is their role in energy security. The case of China, world’s largest manufacturer and exporter of solar and wind technologies, decidedly involves concern over energy-related imports and the domestic importance of the relevant industries.
Birol is entirely correct, however, to highlight that the renewable portfolio is diversifying. This includes next-generation geothermal, which has recently become an area of demonstrated success and much new investment. New technology in this domain promises to provide firm, dispatchable power, as well as to expand beyond areas where heat is confined to near-surface areas. As such technologies mature and spread, they will advance both reduction in emissions and national energy self-reliance.
3. Nuclear Power Is Making a Necessary Comeback
One of the most striking realities of the new energy era is the worldwide resurgence of support for nuclear power. Here, Mr. Birol is an excellent guide . The 2010s, he notes, were a “lost decade” for nuclear generally, even as Russia and China pushed ahead in advanced reactor builds. Today, nuclear is firmly back on the global energy agenda, driven by the dual imperatives of energy security and climate goals.
Last year, nuclear generation hit record highs. In early 2026, no fewer than 74 reactors are under construction—the highest level in 40 years. This includes not only established nuclear nations, like China and South Korea, but also newcomers such as Egypt, Turkey, and Bangladesh. Noteworthy is that a majority of Europe countries with phase-out policies have now reversed course, while others like Finland, Sweden, the UK, and Netherlands are all building or planning new reactors.
In actual construction, the U.S. has not yet joined the current movement, but it soon will. A key reason relates to a new and powerful constituency: Big Tech. The voracious energy appetite of data centers and AI models requires stable, round-the-clock power that weather-dependent renewables cannot always provide. Tech giants are increasingly looking to nuclear—both traditional large-scale reactors and emerging Small Modular Reactors—as the only viable solution to provide long-life, non-carbon, reliable electricity at scale. Big Tech has the capital and the ambition to pursue nuclear, including next generation reactor designs which match very well the sector’s self-image of innovative strength at the leading edge of technological change.
This nuclear comeback represents a triumph of pragmatism over ideology. In a fragmented world, the high energy density, long lifespan, and advancing technology of nuclear power make it an attractive strategic asset. Like renewables, nuclear is a non-carbon source that also adds to energy security.
4. Energy Security Risks Are Multiplying
If the 20th century was defined by risks to oil supply, the 21st century has seen a “multiplication of risks” across a much broader spectrum. Traditional hazards—conflict in the Middle East, pipeline sabotage, price volatility—have not disappeared. Instead, they have been joined by more complex vulnerabilities inherent to the energy transition and to the climate challenge.
Key here is the security of critical minerals. Transition from a fuel-intensive to a materials-intensive energy system has created new choke points. Lithium, cobalt, nickel, and rare earth elements are the new oil, essential for batteries, turbines, motors, and more. Supply chains for these minerals are far more concentrated than the oil market ever was. A single country, China, controls the refining of 19 out of 20 energy-related strategic minerals. This creates a single point of failure for the global energy transition, a vulnerability already being exploited by Beijing through export controls and trade restrictions.
Beyond minerals, “electricity security,” as noted, defines a matter of national survival. Massive blackouts in countries like Spain, Chile, Pakistan, Nigeria, and China, highlight the fragility of grids as they face extreme weather events and seek to integrate higher shares of variable renewables. Climate change itself has become a major risk factor, with heatwaves disabling power plants and droughts drying up hydro reservoirs.
Furthermore, as the energy system digitizes, the threat surface for cyberattacks expands. The war in Ukraine leaves no doubt that national grid systems comprise primary targets, even battlefields, going forward. Moreover, this is already true for adversaries that have not (yet) engaged in actual physical conflict, like Russia and Europe or the U.S. and China, but that launch cyber-attacks on each other with unbroken frequency.
5. States Are Taking Control From Markets
As an economist, Fatih Birol underlines that the era of open, supply-and-demand energy markets, which found its zenith in the 1990s and 2000s, is effectively over. We have entered instead a period of “security mercantilism,” where states aggressively intervene to shape energy outcomes. As Birol rightly claims, energy sources and technologies are now globally viewed as a pillar of national security.
This return of the state is visible everywhere. In America, the Inflation Reduction Act (2022) represented the biggest government intervention in generations, directing billions toward domestic non-carbon technologies. In Europe and Asia, governments are similarly subsidizing supply chains to reduce reliance on geopolitical rivals—specifically China.
Energy flows are no longer determined solely by price and proximity but by alliance structures and security guarantees. Government-to-government negotiations, sanctions regimes, and “friend-shoring” are now the primary mechanisms of energy trade. In this environment, the state is not just a regulator but a central player, directing capital, insuring risk, and picking winners in the race for technological dominance.’Buyer’s Market’
Abundance Is Real But Not Risk-Free
We shouldn’t think, however, that an energy transition is in full swing. A paradox of plenty, in fact, has emerged in fossil fuels, shifting decisively toward a “buyer’s market.” For oil, abundant supply from non-OPEC producers—particularly in the Americas, with the U.S., Canada, Guyana, Brazil, and possibly in the near- to mid-term, Venezuela—is keeping downward pressure on prices, despite conflict in the Middle East. The natural gas market, meanwhile, could soon face a supply glut. A wave of new Liquefied Natural Gas export projects, primarily in Qatar and the U.S., is underway, likely to outpace global demand growth.
Natural gas, however, has strong global demand that will continue for several reasons. One is that it greatly reduces the air pollution in major cities of the developing world, where energy use is growing most rapidly. Another is that it continues to be the main choice to back up solar and wind and to replace coal, a fact that extends from Texas to Frankfurt to Chengdu. A supply overhang will lower prices and urge all this forward.
Oversupply extends to non-carbon energy technologies as well. Global manufacturing capacity for solar panels and batteries has expanded so rapidly that it now far exceeds deployment rates, leading to plummeting prices. For importers—Europe, Japan, Brazil, and South Asia—this is a strategic boon.
However, abundance carries its own risks. A prolonged period of low prices could lull policymakers into complacency, leading to reduced investment in future supply. If the “period of plenty” results in capital flight from the energy sector, it could sow the seeds for the next shortage and price spike later in the decade. The challenge for buyers will be to build strategic reserves and accelerate infrastructure build-out, rather than simply enjoying the temporary discount.
7. Transformation In Who Is Driving Global Trends
Finally, the center of gravity in the global energy system is moving. For the past two decades, the story of global energy growth was largely the story of China. Since 2010, China alone accounted for more than half of the global growth in demand for oil, gas, and electricity. Today, however, China’s economy is maturing, and its energy trajectory is stabilizing.
The baton is being passed to a group of emerging economies. India, with its rapid industrialization and expanding middle class, is set to become the largest source of energy demand growth. It is joined by dynamic economies in Southeast Asia, as well as those of the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa. These “new big players” are increasingly shaping market dynamics, from the demand for coal and oil to the deployment of solar and storage.
The shift complicates the geopolitical map. Energy diplomats in the future, says Mr. Birol, will not only meet in Riyadh, Brussels, and Washington D.C., but increasingly in New Delhi, Jakarta, and Brasilia as well. These nations—together with to China–will determine the pace of the global climate transition and the future of fossil fuel markets. While no single country can replicate the sheer scale of China’s recent history, their collective weight represents a new multipolar reality in energy governance.
Concluding Remarks: Reality Is Still Important
The “blizzard of uncertainties” now present across the energy landscape shouldn’t be mistaken for chaos or anarchy. Beneath the surface, the realities described above provide bedrock for an understanding of what is happening on a global scale. This is the message Fatih Birol would like to communicate.
While his list can’t be called comprehensive–that would be asking too much. It offers a necessary platform to appreciate the range of change that is underway. Were we to add one final certainty to his worthy account, it might be this: nothing in the new energy era stands still, even for a moment, and this includes technological advances being made in every domain of energy production, whether solar panels, geothermal drilling, or oil and gas production.
Leaders who anchor their strategies in reality will be, he insists, in a far better position build the resilient energy systems of tomorrow while providing reliability in the present. The transition to electricity, the resilience of renewables, the revival of nuclear, the true state of energy risks, the shifting facts of global markets, and the continuing need for R&D investment define truths that will persist regardless of the daily news cycle.
Though he does not make it one of his points in what we have been discussing, Birol has also made clear his support for the view that doctrinaire approaches do not work well in the energy sector. For governments, company leaders, investors, and others, the danger of the present lies not in uncertainty itself, but in the demand for overly simple solutions and the paralysis induced by their inevitable failure.
