The last living 20 hostages held by Hamas have been returned to Israel, while at least 250 Palestinians prisoners have been released, marking a significant moment in the conflict. But while US President Donald Trump—says that the “war is over,” serious issues remain unresolved.
Notably, the recent prisoner/hostage exchange is part of a ceasefire and not a peace deal. Ceasefires are temporary pauses in violence while peace agreements outline concrete steps for ending disputes and addressing incompatibilities. Since 1990, more than 230 ceasefires have taken place, yet many have failed.
There are several factors that make ceasefires more likely to breakdown or endure. Ceasefires often breakdown when one actor uses the pause to regroup and rearm, or when one of the warring parties does not have total control over their forces, leading to localized and/or spoiler violations. Ceasefires are more durable when accompanied by agreements on demobilization, governance and with robust monitoring mechanisms in place. These findings raise questions about the future of Hamas’s control over Gaza, its military strength, the likelihood that it will disarm and demobilize and its popularity with Palestinians.
Before Hamas’s 2023 attack on Israel, it had a fighting force of almost 30,000 fighters. Today it estimated that of the 66,000 Gazans killed about 9,000 were Hamas fighters or its ally Islamic Jihad. Hamas may have recruited up to another 15,000 fighters, according to US Congressional estimates, which if accurate means that Hamas has more fighters today than before. That being said, Israel has killed most of Hamas’s senior political and military leadership which has caused disarray within the organization and a leadership vacuum. The issue, however, with Hamas’s lack of leadership is whether this enhances the likelihood of a spoiler attack at a critical juncture.
In addition to the changes in the composition of its forces, in the last two years Hamas has changed its tactics, operating with a flatter and more decentralized structure and relying more on guerrilla warfare than direct confrontation with Israeli troops. An Armed Conflict Location and Event Data report from September showed that Palestinian armed groups fought 65% fewer battles with IDF troops compared to the six months prior. There has also been a huge drop in cross border rocket attacks on Israel by Hamas, as much of its rockets and ammunition have been destroyed. But guerilla attacks have continued sporadically, and new recruits require little training to carry out these types of attacks.
Because of the danger that Hamas poses to peace and stability, a critical part of the 20-point peace plan is that Hamas disarms. So far there is no indication that this will happen. On the contrary, Hamas is reasserting control over parts of Gaza not occupied by Israeli forces, and has also started to locate and target those viewed by Hamas as collaborators and informants.
As Hamas tries to maintain the upper hand, new violent actors have already emerged. In the aftermath of Israel’s invasion, different criminal gangs have surfaced in Gaza. Bloody clashes have ensued between Hamas and different militias, gangs and powerful local families in Gaza City– with human rights organizations accusing Israel of unleashing armed criminal gangs on the Gaza Strip.
One of the notable groups is an Israeli supported militia called the Popular Forces, which has several hundred fighters, drawn primarily from the Bedouin Abu Shabab clan. The Popular Forces are led by Yasser Abu Shabab and operate out of the Rafah area in Southern Gaza. Though the Popular Forces group has been trying to coordinate with other armed groups to work against Hamas, it has also been accused of drug smuggling and looting UN foreign aid trucks. Even if Hamas gave up its weapons, any new stabilization force of regional troops will have to contend with a Gaza that is more fraught with criminality than in the past.
To some degree, the future of Hamas also hinges on its popularity with Palestinians. Hamas is losing support, but has not been rejected completely by Palestinians. Polling from May of 2025 by the Palestinians Center for Policy Survey and Research showed that 58% of Gazans disagreed with Hamas’s attack on Israel compared to only 37% who disagreed in December of 2023.
Interestingly, Hamas is more popular in the West Bank than in Gaza, where it has been increasing its activities. As many as 48% of Gazans supported demonstrations that took place demanding Hamas abandon control over Gaza, but only 14% of those in the West Bank supported these protests.
Divisions are also evident when asked about the disarmament of Hamas. In the West Bank 85% are opposed to disarming Hamas compared to 64% opposed in the Gaza Strip. Evicting Hamas military leaders was also unpopular with those in the West Bank with 71% opposed compared to 51% in Gaza. Though Hamas has mostly been focused on its own survival over governing and has largely been absent from public duties, Hamas is still able to maintain a presence in Gaza.
Hamas is both weakened but still deeply entrenched in Gaza. It remains the dominant political force in Palestinian politics at a time when power in Gaza is increasingly fragmented. The return of the hostages and prisoners represents an important milestone, but the ceasefire is still fragile, and Hamas remains armed and influential.
