On November 28, Georgian special forces joined their Azerbaijani and Turkish counterparts to participate in the annual Caucasian Eagle military exercise. The training, held in Ankara, focused on “strengthening cooperation among the three fraternal countries in security and defense fields in the region.” The military exercise also sought to expand interoperability among Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey to enhance their coordination efforts and combat capabilities. Several soldiers who participated in Caucasian Eagle 2025 also received awards for their performance and work during the training.
The military exercise in Ankara was held just days after Georgian and Azerbaijani officials discussed a defense education plan. During their gathering on November 24, leadership from Georgia’s Defense Institution Building School met with representatives from Azerbaijan’s National Defense University to explore how education experts from the Georgian and Azerbaijani Defense Ministries can collaborate. Their hope is that there will be greater defense cooperation between the two countries.
Georgia’s engagement with Azerbaijan and Turkey to bolster its national security is timely. Earlier this year, the Russian Federation steadily expanded its presence at a naval base in Georgia’s Russian-occupied region of Abkhazia. Analysts told The Wall Street Journal that upgrades to the ports at the base could accommodate Russian warships equipped with cruise missiles, indicating that Russia was strengthening its military capabilities in Abkhazia.
A Country At The Crossroads: Russian Presence And Western Aspirations
It is not the first time Russia has had a military presence in the region. In fact, for nearly 20 years, Russian forces have occupied the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, equating to 20% of Georgian territory. (Abkhazia and South Ossetia are internationally disputed. While the United Nations and the majority of the international community recognize these two regions as Georgian, the Russian Federation has self-declared that they are independent regions.) In August 2008, Russian forces invaded Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Georgians fought back against the invading Russian forces, and they requested assistance from the international community to stop Russian aggression against Georgia. Eventually, the French helped the Georgians broker a ceasefire with the Russians. As the fighting ended, the settlement required Russia to withdraw its forces from Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Instead, the Russian Federation has maintained its military presence in both breakaway regions. This has left Georgian citizens and members of the Georgian opposition parties on edge.
In response to Russia’s military incursion into Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008, several Georgian elected officials, politicians, and policymakers decided that their country should work to integrate with Western organizations such as the European Union and NATO, believing that reforms to Georgian institutions and defense would strengthen Tbilisi’s position against Moscow. The Georgian public was very receptive to this idea, and they supported Western integration efforts.
“Over the years, Georgia has taken visible steps to strengthen its defense (including but not limited to NATO cooperation, new equipment, reserve reforms, and regional partnerships),” Tinatin Japaridze, a Eurasia Analyst at Eurasia Group, told me in an interview. “On paper, the country is modernizing: it participates in the NATO-Georgia Package, hosts major multinational exercises, fields NATO-standard systems like Turkish VURAN armored vehicles, and is rebuilding its reserve and mobilization structure.”
Today, Georgian support for Western integration remains strong. A public opinion poll conducted this year by the Institute of Social Studies and Analysis found that 86% of respondents support Georgia’s integration into the EU. Similarly, 74% of respondents favored Georgia’s accession to NATO. Members of the Georgian opposition parties also support their country’s integration aspirations with these Western organizations.
But as Georgian citizens and the opposition movement push for government reforms so that their country can be incorporated into the EU and NATO, the current majority party in Georgian Parliament, Georgian Dream, has taken methods to distance their country from these Western partnerships. For example, in June, Georgian Dream announced that it would abolish the Information Center for NATO and the EU. Additionally, Georgian Dream suspended talks on integration efforts with the EU. This resulted in several pro-European demonstrations across Georgia, organized by Georgian citizens and members of the Georgian opposition movement.
“The government has increasingly prioritized punishing supposed so-called ‘foreign agents’ through the security services,” Giorgi Beroshvili, an editor at New Eastern Europe magazine, told me in an interview. “Non-governmental organizations, especially the largest and most influential ones, have received the brunt of these attacks. Independent media, activists, and even ordinary protesters face constant pressure and intimidation, being accused of fomenting unrest or sabotage. The government has also expanded this narrative by accusing Western partners of trying to push Georgia into a ‘second front’ since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This agenda, the Georgian version of flooding the zone, is overshadowing any serious focus on the real security issues, such as the occupied territories or strengthening the country’s military readiness.”
Organizations such as Transparency International and the World Bank have also monitored the situation in Georgia. Both have stated that Georgian Dream is backsliding on anticorruption reforms, indicating that the country is heading toward authoritarian rule. Georgian Dream, however, has fallen short of joining Russian-led organizations such as the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization.
“The core issue isn’t capability—it’s coherence,” Japaridze told me. “The Georgian Dream government very publicly and explicitly questions and even undermines Western alignment, while simultaneously assuring their constituents that it remains committed to the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration. This contradictory messaging makes reforms reactive, inconsistent, and easily reversible. Without a clear strategic anchor, even technically sound initiatives risk remaining symbolic rather than transformative.”
Georgia’s Growing Security Ties In The South Caucasus
Now, as Georgia is caught between its citizens and the opposition movement who aspire to join Western organizations, and under pressure from the Russian Federation, Georgian Dream is attempting to adopt a new, neutral position by strengthening ties with countries in the region. Participating in military exercises and diplomatic exchanges with Azerbaijan and Turkey suggests that a new security partnership is taking shape in the South Caucasus.
“Cooperation between Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey through joint trainings helps strengthen basic coordination and signals political goodwill,” Beroshvili told me. “These activities provide useful operational experience for Georgian forces and also ‘allow’ the government to publicly demonstrate continued alignment with NATO standards (even if this is very basic). However, I believe that their impact on the region’s overall security architecture is limited. The Caucasus remains highly fragmented: Georgia faces Russian occupation of 20% of its territory, Armenia and Azerbaijan are going through fragile peace talks, and both Turkey and Russia continue to pursue assertive regional agendas. Thus, while trilateral cooperation is beneficial at the tactical level (and good for masking the true intentions of the Georgian government), its strategic effect on collective security is probably constrained by broader geopolitical realities and uneven national defense priorities.”
The security partnership among Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey will not resolve the ongoing battle between those in Georgia who favor Western integration and the few who favor pragmatic ties with Russia. But for now, closer ties with Azerbaijan and Turkey will temporarily allow Georgia to maintain a strong military and enhance its national security and defense.
“Trilateral cooperation with Azerbaijan and Turkey strengthens Georgia’s regional security footprint,” Japaridze told me. “Joint exercises, protocols, and coordination on infrastructure have created a functional security cluster that enhances deterrence and operational readiness in a volatile region. But it is important to underscore that these regional partnerships cannot and will not replace decades of trust and cooperation with Tbilisi’s Western allies. Georgia’s geography is strategically important and valuable to various major actors in the region, especially as Russia’s influence gradually wanes, but its political drift away from Euro-Atlantic integration limits the strategic impact of these alignments. Ultimately, regional cooperation is a tactical advantage, not a substitute for a coherent, long-term foreign policy.”
It remains to be seen how these military exchanges in the South Caucasus will evolve, and whether Georgian Dream will be able to withstand pressure from Moscow. For now, supporters of Georgia will be interested to see how the defense partnerships with Azerbaijan and Turkey unfold.
“Georgia’s immediate challenge isn’t necessarily military capacity—it’s political coherence. Without a clear, unwavering strategic orientation, the country risks building a modern army with no definitive geopolitical home, leaving any potential security gains and progress precarious amid a rapidly shifting South Caucasus,” Japaridze concluded.
