We need to put tactical nuclear weapons back in South Korea. North Korea’s increasingly dangerous buildup of nukes demands it.
From 1958 to 1991, during the Cold War, the U.S. maintained tactical nuclear weapons on South Korean soil. At their peak in the late 1960s, nearly 950 warheads were deployed on the peninsula, serving as a critical deterrent against North Korean aggression and offsetting Pyongyang’s conventional military superiority. This nuclear presence provided tangible reassurance to Seoul and helped maintain strategic stability in Northeast Asia for over three decades.
The withdrawal of these weapons in 1991 was undertaken with the best of intentions. President George H.W. Bush’s Presidential Nuclear Initiatives reflected the optimism of the post-Cold War era, when the Soviet threat had evaporated and arms reduction seemed prudent. More specifically, the withdrawal was designed as a diplomatic gambit to pressure North Korea into abandoning its nascent nuclear program. North Korea had refused to allow international inspections of its nuclear facilities, citing American nuclear weapons in South Korea as justification. By removing these weapons, Washington hoped to eliminate Pyongyang’s excuses and pave the way for denuclearization of the entire peninsula.
The strategy failed catastrophically. In January 1992 both Koreas signed a Joint Declaration committing to a nuclear-free peninsula. But North Korea never honored this agreement. Instead, the removal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons created a strategic vacuum that Pyongyang exploited ruthlessly. Today, North Korea possesses dozens of nuclear warheads, and its intercontinental ballistic missiles will become capable of reaching the American homeland—a nightmare scenario the 1991 withdrawal was meant to prevent.
This reversal of fortune has created an untenable situation: South Korea, which agreed to forgo nuclear weapons and accepted the removal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from its territory, now faces a nuclear-armed adversary, while its own hands remain tied. Meanwhile, the U.S. continues to maintain tactical nuclear weapons in five European countries. This suggests an inconsistent strategic approach that prioritizes European security over East Asia’s concerns.
Redeployment would address several critical problems. First, it would restore credibility to American deterrence. Current polling shows that less than half of South Koreans believe the U.S. would actually use nuclear weapons to defend them against a North Korean attack. Physical presence of tactical nuclear weapons would provide tangible evidence of American commitment, making the nuclear umbrella credible rather than theoretical.
Second, redeployment would provide Washington and Seoul with negotiating leverage. North Korea’s nuclear monopoly on the peninsula gives Pyongyang disproportionate bargaining power. Tactical nuclear weapons could serve as a valuable chip in future negotiations, creating incentives for North Korean denuclearization that currently don’t exist.
Finally, and perhaps most important, redeployment might prevent South Korean nuclear proliferation. Growing frustration with the current security arrangement has led prominent South Korean politicians to openly discuss developing their own nuclear weapons. Such a development would trigger a cascade of proliferation throughout East Asia. Redeploying U.S. tactical nuclear weapons represents a middle path, reassuring South Korea without unleashing regional nuclear competition.
The 1991 withdrawal was predicated on assumptions that proved tragically incorrect. It’s time to acknowledge this mistake and restore the deterrence that kept the peace for over three decades.
