The Pentagon released a guide earlier this month to educate the public about dangers posed by small unmanned aircraft systems and offer tips on how to defend against them. The Defense Department’s national counter-drone defense unit, the Joint Interagency Task Force 401, created the handbook called “Small Drones, Big Problems: A First Principles Approach to Countering-UAS,” to provide basic guidance aimed at non-military personnel.
“This guide shares vital first principles and direct feedback from warfighters employing [counter]-UAS systems so the entire community has the means, methods and concepts for countering the defining threat of our time,” U.S. Army Maj. Joe Amoroso, the task force’s deputy chief of strategic initiatives, said in a statement.
With so much information about drones and counter-drone weapons publicly available, what guidance does the handbook offer – and is it useful?
A Basic Defense Primer
Industry professionals well-versed in drone and counter-drone technology may find themselves disappointed at the spartan layout and simple approach of the guide, which does not delve into the specifics of in-demand technology and barely scratches the surface of emerging counter-drone tactics.
Members of the public hoping to find a blueprint of how to take down a swooping rogue drone will find no clear-cut best practices for repelling a small unmanned aircraft system in an emergency.
All branches of the U.S. military have been working to develop anti-drone tactics – but the guide does not disclose the specifics of military anti-drone doctrine to the public. The guide is restricted to broad statements and generalities.
Nets, Disruptions, and Camouflage
Close reading, however, reveals a few telling details about what the Pentagon views as best practices for stopping and killing drones. This predominantly includes deceptive measures and signal disruptions as responses to intrusive drones. Disruption aims to force “the operator to change plans, make decisions under pressure, or doubt the chance of success.”
The task force suggests that altering the physical environment, such as putting up nets, barriers to force drones into different flight paths, and making one’s surroundings appear uninteresting from the air can deceive drones.
“This can involve dispersing crowds, vehicles, and equipment so they appear less meaningful from above, obscuring potential targets with clutter, camouflage, or structures that disrupt lines of sight, and deceiving operators through decoys, false electronic signatures, or misleading layouts designed to confuse what they see,” the guide states.
Weaponizing Electromagnetic Energy
The task force touches briefly on the matter of kinetic strikes, or “hard kills,” which denotes stopping a drone using direct violent contact. Hard kills encompass nets, interceptors, bullets and other objects that physically take drones out of action in midair. The guide notes that kinetic strikes come with higher risk of causing collateral damage and impacting bystanders. Focus is primarily on what are known as soft kills, which encompass ways of stopping drones by signal interference or disruptions caused by external energy.
The handbook places great emphasis on disrupting drone signals through electronic warfare. It notes that drones are vulnerable to radio frequency jamming and navigation errors, and can be knocked off course by GPS interference and location spoofing. It underscores the importance of the electromagnetic spectrum including microwaves and various forms of energy that can impact how drones operate.
Electromagnetic energy from electronics such as routers and other types of electronics and machinery can create “a strong noise floor” that can either negatively impact a drone or allow it to “hide in the noise” to move with greater stealth.
The task force points out that the physical environment and forces of nature can affect drones’ performance disproportionately.
“High-rises, metal roofs, warehouses, and fences can make radio waves behave unpredictably, producing echoes or “ghost” signals that distort direction and strength readings,” it states.
A ‘Happy Time’ For Drones
All told, the guiding strategic defense principle contained in the handbook tends to be reactive rather than proactive.
“If a drone cannot find you, cannot track you, or cannot produce an effect, the mission fails regardless of whether the drone survives,” states the manual, summing up the core of its approach to counter-drone defense.
The guide makes several comparisons between threats posed by drones to a period during World War II known as the “Happy Time,” which denotes a four-month stretch in 1940 when German U-boats had the upper hand preying on ships in the Atlantic.
“The ‘happy time’ of drones, like that of Germany’s U-boats, was never permanent. It belonged to a moment — one defined by surprise, uncertainty, and inexperience. That moment has passed,” the guide contends.
But has it?
During World War II, establishing sufficient protection against U-boat incursions was not simple nor was it a matter of waiting things out. There were in fact not one, but two “happy times.” The second era of U-boat strategic supremacy occurred in 1942 and produced such devastating carnage in North American coastal waters that it threatened to knock the United States out of the war, according to the U.S. National Park Service.
What ultimately proved effective at stopping this was not necessarily the convergence of technology and lessons learned, but a proactive rather than reactive strategy towards stopping intrusions. Broadly speaking, the U-boats lost their ability to maraud at will due not only to technological advancements but the U.S. Navy taking a more aggressive approach to submarine hunting.
In most instances, the handbook largely accepts the notion that rogue drones will appear and focuses on how to cope with them afterwards by negating their effects.
Is There A Way to Proactively Dominate Drones?
As drone technology rapidly develops, it is possibly unrealistic to expect a comprehensive account of how potentially malicious uses can be completely mitigated. The guide is clearly intended as a basic primer for the public rather than a tactical blueprint.
Yet questions remain. The guidance suggests that optimal solutions to the drone problem include reshaping and camouflaging our physical surroundings, hoping that surveillance systems will detect drones before they reach targets, and expecting necessary authorities to down them using frequency disruptions or other measures – to be determined.
Even despite all this, the task force observes that defensive arrays might be insufficient to stop rogue drone operators from succeeding in their goals.
“A drone can achieve its purpose even if it is defeated,” the handbook states. “Responding to drones drains resources, triggers unnecessary activity, or diverts attention. If the operator’s goal is to disrupt an event, forcing airspace or road closures could be a ‘success,’ even if the drone crashes.”
Is there a way to proactively and totally stop rogue drones from accessing locations before a crisis arises – to establish air dominance and make areas totally invulnerable in advance rather than reacting to attacks or intrusions?
As counter-drone tactics continue to evolve, technology that lends itself to ensuring invulnerability and shielding areas against drones will be a much-needed defense space to watch.
